An Analysis of Jurisdictional Issues Presented when State-Employed Seamen are Injured and Seek Redress by Fitzgerald, John Richard
ARTICLES
AN ANALYSIS OF JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
PRESENTED WHEN STATE-EMPLOYED
SEAMEN ARE INJURED AND SEEK REDRESS
JoHN RICmARD FITZGERALD*
I. INTRODUCTION
State Department of Public Safety v. Brown ' appears to be the first
published opinion expressly allowing injured state-employed seamen
to sue a state under the Jones Act2 in state court.3 Brown held that
neither the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act4 nor the doctrine of
sovereign immunity bars a state-employed seaman from asserting fed-
eral maritime claims against the State of Alaska in state court. 5 This
article will explore the jurisdictional issues presented in such an action
and will examine the possibility that the remedies presently available
to injured state-employed seamen will be limited in the future.
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1. 794 P.2d 108 (Alaska 1990).
2. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988). The Jones Act provides a statutory remedy dis-
tinct from such common law maritime remedies as "maintenance and cure" to seamen
injured in the course of their employment. See infra notes 26, 62 for text and sum-
mary description of the Jones Act.
3. The United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the issue of whether
Congress intended to expose states to liability under the Jones Act. See Welch v.
Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 476 n.6 (1987); cf Petty v.
Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959) (allowing Jones Act suit
where an interstate compact expressly permitted the bi-state corporation to sue and be
sued). Subsequent to the Alaska Supreme Court's decision in Brown to allow Jones
Act claims to be brought against the State of Alaska in superior court, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has
consented to be sued under the Jones Act in its superior court for claims not exceeding
$100,000. Morris v. Massachusetts Maritime Academy, 565 N.E.2d 422 (Mass.
1991). See infra pp. 218-19.
4. ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.30.005-.270 (1990).
5. Brown, 794 P.2d at 110-11.
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Part II will provide a brief overview of the jurisdiction of state
and federal Courts to hear maritime and Jones Act claims. Part III
will discuss sovereign immunity principles relevant to Jones Act suits
against a state in both federal and state court. The tension between a
Jones Act tort remedy and the exclusivity provisions of the Alaska
Workers' Compensation Act will be described in Part IV, and Part V
will analyze the Alaska Supreme Court's resolution of this tension in
State Department of Public Safety v. Brown. Part VI will discuss legis-
lative power to restrict seamen's remedies to workers' compensation,
and will explore policy and constitutional considerations that militate
against depriving state-employed seamen of Jones Act relief in state
court.
II. JURISDICTION OF STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS TO HEAR
MARITIME AND JONES ACT CLAIMS
The Federal Judiciary Code bestows upon the district courts ex-
clusive jurisdiction of "[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime juris-
diction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they
are otherwise entitled."' 6 This clause, known as the "saving to suitors"
clause, has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to reserve in the
plaintiff the right to pursue any common law remedies he might have
in any common law court able to hear his claim.7
Historically, admiralty claims have been categorized as either in
personam or in rem.8 This distinction becomes important in determin-
ing the jurisdiction of state and federal courts to hear maritime claims.
In personam suits in admiralty, like in personam civil actions, are
brought against a named person or corporation for personal liability. 9
In rem suits in admiralty, though, are based on the concept of the
"maritime lien." A maritime lien is a right unique to admiralty law,
"conceived of as a property interest in the tangible thing involved
(usually but not always a ship)," arising "upon the occurrence of cer-
tain mishaps or the non-fulfillment of certain obligations arising out of
contract or status."' 0 Contemporary principles of admiralty law con-
tinue to recognize the distinction between in personam and in rem
claims.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988).
7. Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Mach. Co., 237 U.S. 303 (1915); Knapp,
Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638 (1900); Leon v. Galceran, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.)
185 (1870).
8. GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 35
(2d ed. 1975).
9. Id.
10. Id.
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In the case of general maritime claims, the saving to suitors clause
allows concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over in personam suits.
In personam suits may be brought in federal court under admiralty
jurisdiction and in state court under the saving to suitors clause on the
theory that the remedy sought is a common law remedy that can be
granted by a common law court.1
The saving to suitors clause does not, however, preserve the right
to bring in rem proceedings in state court, as in rem proceedings in
admiralty are based on the maritime lien and considered foreign to the
common law. 12 In rem claims are only enforceable in admiralty, and
can therefore be brought only in federal district court. 13
Unlike the general admiralty claims discussed above, jurisdiction
over Jones Act claims is governed by the language of the Act itself.
The language of the Act seems to indicate that federal jurisdiction is
exclusive: "Dj]urisdiction ... shall be under the court of the district in
which the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is
located."' 4  The Supreme Court, however, has construed the term
"jurisdiction" in the second sentence of the Jones Act as actually
meaning "venue," rather than the power of the court to hear a claim.15
Based on this interpretation, the Court has held that state and federal
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Jones Act actions. 16
III. STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. State Sovereign Immunity Against Jones Act Claims in Federal
Court
While federal law permits in personam maritime claims and Jones
Act actions to be brought in state and federal court, a suit against a
11. See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1986);
Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 560-61 (1954); Shannon v. City of
Anchorage, 478 P.2d 815, 818 (Alaska 1970).
12. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 8, at 38.
13. The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555, 569-71 (1866); Shannon v. City of
Anchorage, 478 P.2d 815, 818 (Alaska 1970). Since in rem admiralty claims can only
be brought in federal court, state-employed seamen may not proceed in rem against
state-owned vessels unless the state has explicitly waived its sovereign immunity
against suit in federal court.
14. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (1988).
15. Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
16. Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33 (1926); Panama R.R. v. Vasquez, 271 U.S.
557 (1926). Two years later, the Supreme Court determined that the Jones Act pro-
vides only for in personam actions and does not provide for in rem liability. Plamals v.
The Pinar Del Rio, 277 U.S. 151 (1928).
1991]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
state is barred unless the state has waived its sovereign immunity as to
tort claims brought against it.17
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution18
forbids a citizen of one state from bringing a suit in law or equity
against another state in federal court without the consent of that state.
By its literal terms, the Eleventh Amendment does not forbid a citizen
of one state from bringing suit in law or equity against his own state in
federal court. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in Hans v. Louisiana 19
gave effect to what it construed to be the spirit of the amendment, that
states cannot be made unwilling defendants in federal court.20 Hans
prohibits a citizen from suing his own state in federal court, and has
been the law of the land for over one hundred years.
The Eleventh Amendment does not grant the states absolute im-
munity. Important exceptions exist to the prohibition against a citizen
suing his own state or another state in federal court. Where Congress
has acted pursuant to its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, it
may abrogate the sovereign immunity of states.21 The Supreme Court
has also held in Parden v. Terminal Railway22 that Congress can abro-
gate states' sovereign immunity pursuant to its powers under the Com-
merce Clause. 23 The Court reasoned that "[b]y empowering Congress
to regulate commerce, then, the States necessarily surrendered any
portion of their sovereignty that would stand in the way of such
regulation."24
In addition to holding that Congress has the power to abrogate
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Commerce
Clause to the extent that the states are engaged in interstate com-
merce, 25 Parden held that a state's operation of a common carrier in
17. State Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Brown, 794 P.2d 108, 109-10 (Alaska 1990);
Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 473 (1987); Morris
v. Massachusetts Maritime Academy, 565 N.E.2d 422, 427 (Mass. 1991).
18. The Eleventh Amendment states: "The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prose-
cuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
19. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
20. See also Employees v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279,
291-92 (1973).
21. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
22. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
23. Id. at 192.
24. Id.
25. Id.
206 [Vol. 8:203
STATE-EMPLOYED SEAMEN
interstate commerce after adoption of the Federal Employers' Liabil-
ity Act ("FELA")26 constitutes a constructive waiver of sovereign
immunity.2 7
The text of the Eleventh Amendment is silent regarding suits
brought in admiralty by a citizen against a state.28 In the 1921 cases
entitled Ex Parte New York No. 129 and Ex Parte New York No. 2,30
however, the Supreme Court ruled that unconsenting states are im-
mune from admiralty actions brought in federal court by citizens, irre-
spective of whether the action is brought in personam31 or in rem. 32
While the continued viability of these holdings was cast into doubt by
the implied waiver aspect of Parden, a deeply divided Supreme Court
partially overruled Parden in Welch v. Texas Department of Highways
& Public Transportation,33 and reaffirmed the rules of Hans and Ex
26. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988). The FELA is a federal workers' compensation act
which protects employees of railroads engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. The
Jones Act incorporates the substantive law of the FELA as follows:
Any Seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employ-
ment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the
right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States
modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of per-
sonal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in case of the death of any
seaman as a result of any such personal injury the personal representative of
such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law with the right of
trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States conferring or
regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway employees shall
be applicable. Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the
district in which the defendant employer resides or in which his principal
office is located.
46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
27. Parden, 377 U.S. at 192.
28. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits construing the judicial power of the
United States to extend to certain suits "in law or equity" commenced against one of
the United States, but does not expressly prohibit suits that are brought in admiralty.
See supra note 18 for the text of the Eleventh Amendment. The late Justice Story
doubted whether the Eleventh Amendment extends to cases of admiralty jurisdiction
because suits in admiralty are not technically suits "in law or equity." 3 JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 560-61
(1833). "Justice Story was noted for his expansive view of the admiralty jurisdiction
of federal courts." Welch, 483 U.S. at 493 n.25. Indeed, "[i]t was said of the late
Justice Story, that if a bucket of water were brought into his court with a corn cob
floating in it, he would at once extend the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States
over it." Note, Extension of Federal Jurisdiction over State Canals, 37 Am. L. Rev.
911, 916 (1903).
29. 256 U.S. 490 (1921).
30. 256 U.S. 503 (1921).
31. Ex Parte New York No. 1, 256 U.S. at 502.
32. Ex Parte New York No. 2, 256 U.S. at 511.
33. 483 U.S. 468 (1987). The Texas Department of Highways and Public Trans-
portation operates an automobile and passenger ferry between Point Bolivar and Gal-
veston, Texas. Jean Welch, a marine technician employed in the operation of the
1991]
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Parte New York No. 1.34 Welch overruled the constructive waiver por-
tion of Parden by holding that "an abrogation of Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity by Congress must be expressed in unmistakably clear
language. '35 The Jones Act was found not to contain a clear expres-
sion of Congressional intent to abrogate the sovereign immunity of
ferry, sustained injury when she was crushed between a mobile crane and the ferry
dock. She filed a Jones Act suit against the department and the state in federal district
court. Id. at 471.
34. Id. at 473, 489. Four dissenting justices, led by retired Justice Brennan, fa-
vored narrowing the scope of sovereign immunity by overruling Hans and Ex Parte
New York No. 1. Id. at 499-503 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The forceful dissent in
Welch argued that:
[Tihe Eleventh Amendment does not bar the District Court's jurisdiction
over the Jones Act suit by Jean Welch against the State of Texas... for four
independent reasons. First, the Amendment does not limit federal jurisdic-
tion over suits in admiralty. Second, the Amendment bars only actions
against a State by citizens of another State or of a foreign nation. Third, the
Amendment applies only to diversity suits. Fourth, even assuming the Elev-
enth Amendment were applicable to the present Case, Congress abrogated
state immunity from suit under the Jones Act ....
Id. at 497.
The four dissenters were of the opinion that the Eleventh Amendment operates as
a jurisdictional bar to suits against a state in federal court "only in 'Cases in Law and
Equity,' and not in 'Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.'" Id. at 498 (em-
phasis in original). "The distinction between admiralty cases and ordinary cases in
law or equity was not a casual or technical one from the viewpoint of the Framers of
the Constitution. Admiralty was a highly significant, perhaps the most important,
subject-matter area for federal jurisdiction at the end of the 18th century." Id. at 501.
The four Justices dissenting in the splintered Welch decision argued that the "Elev-
enth Amendment applies only to diversity suits and not to federal-question or admi-
ralty suits." Id. at 509. According to the dissent, the doctrine of state sovereign
immunity, "based on a notion of kingship, intrudes impermissibly on Congress' law-
making power" because
the doctrine.., is pernicious. In an era when sovereign immunity has been
generally recognized by courts and legislatures as an anachronistic and un-
necessary remnant of a feudal legal system.... the Court has aggressively
expanded its scope .... [T]he current doctrine intrudes on the ideal of
liberty under law by protecting the States from the consequences of their
illegal conduct. And the decision obstructs the sound operation of our fed-
eral system by limiting the ability of Congress to take steps it deems neces-
sary and proper to achieve national goals within its constitutional authority.
Id. at 520-21 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 302 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
The dissent therefore "adhere[d] to the view that a suit brought under a federal
law against a State is not barred." Id. at 516.
35. Id. at 478; cf Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492
U.S. 96, 101 (1989) (holding that Congress did not abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity of states by enacting section 106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§ 106(c), because it failed to make its intention "unmistakably clear in the language of
the statute").
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states operating common carriers in interstate commerce,36 even
though the statute extends liability to employers of "any seaman. '37
The ruling by the United States Supreme Court that the Jones
Act, in and of itself, does not abrogate properly asserted sovereign im-
munity of states against suit in federal court38 effectively overturned
the holdings of several published decisions of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Alaska. Relying on the second prong of
Parden, these cases had held that the State of Alaska could be sued in
federal court under the Jones Act and the general maritime law.39 Af-
ter Welch, a Jones Act plaintiff can no longer rely on a theory of con-
structive waiver, but must show that the State of Alaska has expressly
waived its sovereign immunity against suit in federal court.
Shortly after Welch, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in
Collins v. State40 that the Alaska Claims Against the State Act
("CATSA") 4 1 does not constitute an express waiver of Alaska's sover-
eign immunity from suit in federal court under the Jones Act or the
general maritime law.4 2 Thus, the State of Alaska has not waived its
sovereign immunity so as to permit Jones Act suits to be brought
against it in federal court.
43
B. State Sovereign Immunity Against Jones Act Claims in State
Court
The term "sovereign immunity" embraces two distinct concepts,
"not merely whether [a state] may be sued, but where it may be
sued." 44 A state may consent to be sued, but may nonetheless restrict
36. Welch, 483 U.S. at 475.
37. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988). "[,V]e hold today that the general language of
the Jones Act does not authorize suits against the States in federal court." Welch, 483
U.S. at 476.
38. Welch, 483 U.S. at 475.
39. The cases that are no longer good law include Cole v. State, 621 F. Supp. 3
(D. Alaska 1984), which held that the State of Alaska could be sued in federal court
for unseaworthiness, and Cocherel v. State, 246 F. Supp. 328 (D. Alaska 1965), which
held that the State of Alaska could be sued in federal court under the Jones Act be-
cause it had waived Eleventh Amendment immunity by operating a ferry in interstate
commerce on navigable waters.
40. 823 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1987).
41. ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (1983 & Supp. 1990). The full text of the Claims
Against the State Act appears infra note 48.
42. Collins, 823 F.2d at 332.
43. Id.
44. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984) (empha-
sis in original). As Justice Powell noted in Welch, "a state does not waive Eleventh
Amendment immunity in federal courts merely by waiving sovereign immunity in its
own courts." 483 U.S. at 473-74 (citing Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99 n.9).
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to its own courts the forum in which suit may be brought.45 The ques-
tion of whether, and in what forum, state sovereign immunity has been
waived involves an analysis of state law.46 CATSA constitutes a par-
tial waiver of the state's sovereign immunity from contract, quasi-con-
tract and tort claims.4 7 The Act waives sovereign immunity for these
actions against the State of Alaska in state court, but does not author-
ize suit against the State in federal court.48
The Alaska Supreme Court has construed CATSA as constitut-
ing a waiver of the state's sovereign immunity from admiralty tort
claims brought in state court.4 9 The court has also recently inter-
preted the Act to constitute a waiver of the state's immunity from
Jones Act claims brought in state court.50 Thus, a suit against the
State of Alaska seeking the federal remedy provided by the Jones Act
is not available in federal court, but only in Alaska state court.
45. See Morris v. Massachusetts Maritime Academy, 565 N.E.2d 422, 426 (Mass.
1991) ("Although the Supreme Court never has addressed the question whether States
may claim immunity in their own courts when the Eleventh Amendment bars suit in
Federal court, we think that, absent congressional command to the contrary, they
may." (citation omitted)).
46. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464-65 (1945).
47. ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (1983 & Supp. 1990).
48. Id. The complete text of CATSA reads:
A person or corporation having a contract, quasi-contract, or tort claim
against the state may bring an action against the state in the superior court.
A person who may present the claim under [Alaska Statutes section] 44.77
may not bring an action under this section except as set out in [Alaska Stat-
utes section] 44.77.040(c). A person who may bring an action under [Alaska
Statutes sections] 36.30.560-36.30.695 may not bring an action under this
section except as set out in [Alaska Statutes section] 36.30.685. However, no
action may be brought under this section if the claim
(1) is an action for tort, and is based upon an act or omission of an
employee of the state, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not the statute or regulation is valid; or is an action
for tort, and based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exer-
cise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a state agency
or an employee of the state, whether or not the discretion involved is abused;
(2) is fbr damages caused by the imposition or establishment of a quar-
antine by the state;
(3) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, mali-
cious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit,
or interference with contract rights; or
(4) arises out of the use of an ignition interlock device certified under
[Alaska Statutes section] 33.05.020(c).
Id. (emphasis added).
49. State Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Brown, 794 P.2d 108, 110 (Alaska 1990) (citing
State v. Stanley, 506 P.2d 1284, 1290-91 & n.9 (Alaska 1973)).
50. Id. at 110-11. The rationale and holding of Brown are discussed infra part IV
A-C.
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IV. TENSION BETWEEN THE ALASKA WORKERS' COMPENSATION
ACT AND THE JONES ACT
As discussed above, when a state has waived its sovereign immu-
nity against suit in its own courts, a federal maritime claim may be
asserted in state court. In such a proceeding, the state court applies
federal substantive law.5 1 This application of federal substantive law
by state courts is sometimes referred to as the "reverse-Erie" doctrine
because it is the reverse of the Erie doctrine dictating the application
of state substantive law by federal courts exercising diversity jurisdic-
tion.5 2 Under the reverse-Erie doctrine in the maritime context, while
"states may sometimes supplement federal maritime policies, a state
may not deprive a person of any substantial admiralty rights as defined
in controlling acts of Congress or by interpretative decisions of [the
United States Supreme Court]. '5 3 Thus, certain aspects of state law
may be applied in a maritime action so long as that law does not de-
prive the plaintiff of a federal remedy.5 4
51. Weason v. Harville, 706 P.2d 306, 308 (Alaska 1985); Barber v. New England
Fish Co., 510 P.2d 806, 808 (Alaska 1973); Shannon v. City of Anchorage, 478 P.2d
815, 818 (Alaska 1970).
52. See, e.g., Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1986);
Morris v. Massachusetts Maritime Academy, 565 N.E.2d 422, 424-25 (Mass. 1991).
Regarding the doctrine of federal court application of state law, see Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
53. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953). Pope & Talbot held that a
federal maritime remedy could not be restricted by a common law remedy recognized
under state law. Id. at 409-10. The Supreme Court recognized comparative fault as a
principle of the general maritime law, rejecting application of the stricter state contrib-
utory negligence regime and stating that "the harsh rule of the common law," which
would have completely barred recovery of a general maritime law claim, "is com-
pletely incompatible with modem admiralty policy and practice." Id. at 408-09; see
also Powell v. Offshore Navigation, Inc., 644 F.2d 1063, 1065 n.5 (5th Cir.) ("State
law may of course supplement federal maritime law, as ... in the provision of an
additional maritime tort remedy; state law may not, however, conflict with federal
maritime law.... ."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 972 (1981).
54. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 8, at 47-48. The analysis of whether state
substantive law deprives the claimant of federal admiralty rights is one of federal law.
Pope & Talbot, 346 U.S. at 409; see Brown, 794 P.2d at 110-11. For cases prohibiting
state interference with federal maritime rights, see Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
398 U.S. 375 (1970) (admiralty action for wrongful death permitted despite state law
prohibiting wrongful death action based on unseaworthiness claim); Kossick v. United
Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961) (admiralty claim for maintenance and cure permitted
despite state statute of frauds nullifying verbal agreements); McAllister v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958) (Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims permitted
despite state statute of limitations); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215-16
(1917) ("No [state statute] is valid if it.... works material prejudice to the characteris-
tic features of the general maritime law .... "); The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.)
558, 575 (1875) ("It certainly could not have been the intention [of the Constitution]
to place the rules and limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the
several States . . . ."); Rig Tenders v. Santa Fe Drilling Co., 536 P.2d 114 (Alaska
1991]
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The tort remedy the Jones Act affords injured seamen who bring
suit in Alaska state court conflicts with the exclusivity provisions of
the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act ("WCA"). 55 The WCA
states that "[t]he [compensation] liability of an employer.., is exclu-
sive and in place of all other liability... to the employee.., in law or
in admiralty . . . ",56 The Jones Act, on the other hand, allows an
injured seaman to sue his employer in tort, and is thus at odds with the
WCA's restriction of an injured employee to a compensation claim
against his employer.57 The issue of whether an employer can consti-
tutionally restrict a seaman to a workers' compensation remedy was
recently addressed by the Alaska Supreme Court in State Department
of Public Sajty v. Brown.58
V. STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY v BROWN
A. Background of State Department of Public Safety v. Brown
On June 18, 1985, the Vigilant, an Alaska Public Safety Patrol
Vessel, was on patrol for suspected fishing violators in Bristol Bay
1975) (admiralty claim for implied warranty of workmanlike performance under fed-
eral law permitted although state law does not recognize the warranty); Barber v. New
England Fish Co., 510 P.2d 806 (Alaska 1973) (admiralty claim for unseaworthiness
permitted despite worker's previous acceptance of benefits under the Alaska Workers'
Compensation Act).
55. ALASKA, STAT. § 23.30.055 (1990). The complete text of the exclusivity pro-
vision of the WCA reads:
The liability of an employer prescribed in [Alaska Statutes section] 23.30.045
is exclusive and in place of all other liability of the employer and any fellow
employee to the employee, the employee's legal representative, husband or
wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to re-
cover damages from the employer or the fellow employee at law or in admi-
ralty on account of the injury or death. However, if an employer fails to
secure payment of compensation as required by this chapter, an injured em-
ployee or the employee's legal representative in case death results from the
injury may elect to claim compensation under this chapter, or to maintain an
action against the employer at law or in admiralty for damages on account of
the injury or death. In that action the defendant may not plead as a defense
that the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow servant, or that the
employee assumed the risk of the employment, or that the injury was due to
the contributory negligence of the employee.
Id.
56. Id. (emphasis added).
57. Compare 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988) with ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.055 (1990).
Additional tension between the Jones Act and the WCA is caused by the so-called
Jensen rule. That rule is based upon the time-honored case Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917), which held that states are constitutionally barred
from applying their compensation regimes to maritime injuries because to do so would
interfere with the overriding federal policy of uniformity in maritime law. See infra p.
222.
58. 794 P.2d 108 (Alaska 1990).
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when Robert Brown, the Vigilant's state-employed First Mate, sus-
tained an injury as he boarded a fishing vessel for an inspection.5 9
Brown contends that he was ordered by his superior to board the F/V
Halo by jumping from the deck of the Vigilant onto the deck of the
Halo. He allegedly obeyed the command, and was injured by the force
of landing on the HaloY°
Robert Brown initially accepted workers' compensation benefits,
then sued the State of Alaska, among other individuals, 61 in tort. The
state's liability was allegedly based on the Jones Act62 and the general
maritime doctrine of unseaworthiness. 63 Since neither the Jones Act
nor CATSA effectuates a waiver of Alaska's sovereign immunity
against suit in federal court,64 Robert Brown filed his claims in state
superior court.
The State of Alaska moved for summary judgment, contending
that the exclusive remedy provision of the WCA65 restricted Brown's
remedy to compensation.66 The State also argued that it was pro-
tected from suit in state court under the Jones Act by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. 67
59. Id. at 109.
60. Affidavit of Robert Brown paras. 5-7 (Dec. 16, 1987), Brown v. State, No.
3AN-87-5394-Civ. (Alaska Super. Ct. 1988) (on file with Alaska Law Review).
61. Raising general maritime law negligence claims, Brown also sued Lieutenant
Tom Schwantes, his superior who allegedly gave the order to board in an unsafe man-
ner; Sherburne H. Smith, the skipper of the Halo who allegedly operated the fishing
vessel in a negligent manner during the boarding; and, under an agency theory, Smith
Lighterage, Inc., the owner of the Halo. Complaint paras. 4, 8-10, Brown v. State,
No. 3AN-87-5394-Civ. (Alaska Super. Ct. filed June 11, 1987) (on file with Alaska
Law Review).
62. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988). The Jones Act, unlike state workers' compensa-
tion statutes, permits an injured seaman to recover in tort against his employer. The
Jones Act allows for a jury trial, Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U.S. 521
(1957), requires only a "featherweight" showing of causation in order to trigger liabil-
ity, id. at 523, and provides for in personam liability of an employer as opposed to in
rem liability of the vessel, Plamals v. The Pinar Del Rio, 277 U.S. 151, 155 (1928).
63. The doctrine of unseaworthiness imposes a form of absolute liability where a
vessel or her appurtenances are not reasonably fit for their intended purpose and cause
injury. "The ship is not freed from liability by mere due diligence to render her sea-
worthy .... [T]here is an absolute obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel and, in
default thereof, liability follows for any injuries caused by a breach of the obligation."
Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 548 (1960) (quoting The H.A. Scan-
drett, 87 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir. 1937)); Manich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 99
(1944); The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1920).
64. See supra part II.
65. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.055 (1990); see supra part III.
66. Brown, 794 P.2d at 109.
67. Id.
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The court was faced first with the state-law issue of whether
Alaska had waived its sovereign immunity, and secondly with the fed-
eral issue of whether the WCA exclusivity provision impermissibly re-
stricted or deprived Brown of substantial admiralty rights as defined
by the Jones Act and the general maritime law.
The sup -rior court allowed Robert Brown's state-court Jones Act
suit to be maintained.68 The court held that the State of Alaska had
waived its sovereign immunity as to Jones Act and general maritime
law claims brought in state court, and that application of the exclusiv-
ity provision of the WCA would deprive Brown of substantial admi-
ralty rights.69
The Alaska Supreme Court granted a petition for review on the
issue of whether Brown's admiralty claims were barred by sovereign
immunity.70
B. The Holding of the Alaska Supreme Court
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the superior
court and held that (1) the State of Alaska has waived its sovereign
immunity as to Jones Act and general maritime law claims brought in
state court; (2) the exclusive remedy provision of the WCA cannot
deprive an injured state seaman of his federal Jones Act remedy; and
(3) previous acceptance of workers' compensation does not prohibit
subsequent maintenance of a Jones Act tort suit, although double re-
covery is prohibited. 71
The supreme court first rejected the State's theory that Alaska
had never waived its sovereign immunity against claims by state em-
ployees arising out of injuries sustained during the course and scope of
their employment on navigable waters.72 The court noted that
CATSA 73 had been construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity as to
admiralty tort claims brought in superior court74 and emphasized
CATSA's broad language that "[a] person or corporation having a
contract, quasi-contract, or tort claim against the state may bring an
action against the state in the superior court. ' 75 The court observed
that, subject to certain statutory exceptions, the intent of CATSA was
to put the state on equal footing with private persons who are sued in
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 110-11.
72. Id. at 111.
73. ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (1983 & Supp. 1990); see supra note 48.
74. Brown, 794 P.2d at 110 (citing State v. Stanley, 506 P.2d 1284, 1290-91 & n.9
(Alaska 1973)).
75. ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (1983 & Supp. 1990).
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tort.76 Regarding Jones Act claims specifically, the majority stressed
that as far back as 1963 former Attorney General Hayes had expressed
in a formal opinion that CATSA constitutes a waiver of immunity
under which "the State may be sued for negligent torts which arise
under the Jones Act." 77
Turning to the exclusivity of liability provisions of the WCA, the
court agreed with the State that recovery against the state under a
state common law cause of action was barred by the Act.78 The court
stated:
The Workers' Compensation Act, to which the state is subject to
the same extent as private employers, provides in part that "[t]he
liability of an employer [under the... Act] is exclusive and in place
of all other liability of the employer .... ,,79
This provision would effectively bar any suit by Brown for damages
under state common law. A Jones Act claim, however, is not a state
law cause of action even when it is brought in state court. Under the
reverse-Erie doctrine, state courts apply federal law in adjudicating
Jones Act claims, and cannot restrict the federal remedy. 80 The court
in Brown therefore held that workers' compensation exclusivity cannot
bar a federal Jones Act claim brought in state court. Although the
exclusive remedy defense is "fully applicable to all claims against the
state brought under state law.., the defense does not apply to federal
remedies."81
The court explained its rationale by analogizing to several cases
where unseaworthiness claims .were permitted against private employ-
ers notwithstanding exclusive remedy provisions of workers' compen-
sation acts.82 The majority was, however, unable to cite a single case
76. Id.
77. Brown, 794 P.2d at 110 (quoting 28 Op. Att'y Gen. 12 (1963)).
78. Id.
79. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
80. Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1986); Morris v.
Massachusetts Maritime Academy, 565 N.E.2d 422, 424-25 (Mass. 1991). See supra
note 54 and accompanying text.
81. Brown, 794 P.2d at 111. In support of its proposition that a state court cannot
deprive a seaman of substantial rights under the Jones Act or the general maritime
law, the court cited Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953), see supra note 53,
and Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 386 (1924). The court found that "[t]hese
precedents compel the conclusion that the exclusive remedy provisions of the Alaska
Workers' Compensation Act cannot deprive Brown of his federal Jones Act claim
against the state." Brown, 794 P.2d at 111.
82. Brown, 794 P.2d at 110-11. Cases cited and discussed by the court included
Barber v. New England Fish Co., 510 P.2d 806 (Alaska 1973) (longshoreman injured
aboard employer's barge was allowed a federal maritime law claim for unseaworthi-
ness notwithstanding the exclusive remedy provision of WCA); Thibodaux v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 580 F.2d 841, 847 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[A]n exclusive remedy provision in
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directly holding that an injured state maritime employee is entitled to
sue in state court under the Jones Act.8 3
Finally, the Brown court held that acceptance of workers' com-
pensation benefits does not deprive an injured seaman of the right to
sue in tort under the Jones Act. 4 If the seaman succeeds in his suit,
however, the employer may deduct from the judgment monies it has
already paid. s5 The court's ruling that Brown's acceptance of benefits
under the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act does not bar his Jones
Act claim is consistent with previous Alaska case law on the non-
preclusive effect of accepting compensation benefits.86
C. The Dissent's Statutory Construction Theory
The dissenting opinion of Justice Compton supported the statu-
tory construction approach advocated by the State in reaching the
conclusion that the WCA limits Brown's recovery to compensation.
Justice Compton focused his analysis upon the statutory construction
principle that repeal by implication is not favored, and repeal of a spe-
cific statutory provision by a later-enacted, more general statutory
provision is extraordinary.8 7
Under Justice Compton's formulation, the earliest versions of the
WCA accomplished a specific, limited waiver of sovereign immunity
that predated the more general waiver in CATSA.88 The remedy of an
injured state-employed seaman is limited to compensation, in Justice
a state workmen's compensation law cannot be applied when it will conflict with mari-
time policy and undermine substantive rights afforded by federal maritime law."),
cert denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979).
83. The United States Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue of whether the
Jones Act affords a remedy against a state employer. "The Court expressly stops
short of addressing the issue whether the Jones Act affords a remedy to seamen em-
ployed by the States." Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S.
468, 495 (White, J., concurring); cf. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359
U.S. 275, 282 (1959) (Jones Act claims allowed where interstate compact expressly
permitted bi-state corporation to sue and be sued). Subsequent to the Alaska Supreme
Court's ruling on the matter, however, at least one other court has found that the
Jones Act does afford a remedy to injured state seamen. Morris v. Massachusetts
Maritime Academy, 565 N.E.2d 422 (Mass. 1991). See discussion infra part V A.
84. Brown, 794 P.2d at 110.
85. Id. at 110 n. 1. In the event that compensation is paid by one insurance com-
pany and a tort judgment becomes payable by another, the compensation carrier is
entitled to reimbursement. See Barber, 510 P.2d at 813 n.39.
86. In Barber, the court concluded that "prohibiting the plaintiff from pursuing
his unseaworthiness claim because he took advantage of Alaska's Workmen's Com-
pensation Act would materially prejudice the characteristic features of federal law and
interfere with the uniformity of that law." 510 P.2d at 811.
87. Brown, 794 P.2d at 113 (Compton, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 112-13.
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Compton's view, because the State, as employer, has waived its sover-
eign immunity only for workers' compensation claims, not for tort
claims.89 Justice Compton would have the court construe CATSA so
as not to repeal by implication the earlier-enacted, limited waiver of
sovereign immunity applicable exclusively to workers' compensation
liability.90
The majority rejected Justice Compton's statutory construction
theory, quoting the trial judge's earlier rejection of the argument:
"[t]he workers' compensation law is construed as simply a limita-
tion regarding all employer-employee relations. It has nothing to
do with limiting the waiver of sovereign immunity. In the case of
admiralty law, workers' compensation principles are superseded by
federal law for all employees, state workers constituting no
exception." 91
The majority of the supreme court thus agreed with the trial court in
rejecting the State's contention that the exclusive liability provisions of
the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act operate as a limitation on the
state's waiver of sovereign immunity. 92
D. Analysis of State Department of Public Safety v. Brown
1. Statutory Analysis The Claims Against the State Act enumer-
ates several exceptions to the waiver of sovereign immunity.93 An ex-
ception for maritime tort claims is not among those listed. If the
legislature had intended to retain sovereign immunity as against mari-
time tort claims, an exception could have been included in CATSA
along with the other enumerated exceptions. 94
89. Id. at 112. Justice Compton also believes that Congress never intended to
expose states to liability under the Jones Act because its intention to do so has not
been made "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." Id. at 113 (quoting
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989)).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 109.
92. Id. at 109-11.
93. ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (1983 & Supp. 1990). Examples of some of the
claims to which the state has not consented to be sued include claims for damages
caused by the imposition of a quarantine, and claims arising out of assault, battery,
false imprisonment, false arrest or malicious prosecution. Id.; see supra note 48.
94. Justice Compton accuses the majority of fashioning a "requirement that reten-
tions of sovereign immunity must necessarily be explicit .... ." Brown, 794 P.2d at
112-13 (Compton, J., dissenting). CATSA, however, contains a general waiver of sov-
ereign immunity, followed by particular enumerated exceptions. Under principles of
statutory construction recognized by the supreme court, additional exceptions from a
general statute should not be implied. "Especially where there is an express exception,
it comprises the only limitation on the operation of the statute and no other exceptions
will be implied. An enumeration of exceptions from the operation of a statute indi-
cates that it should apply to all cases not specifically enumerated." Libby v. City of
Dillingham, 612 P.2d 33, 40-41 & n.25 (Alaska 1980) (citing 2A C. DALLAS SANDS,
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The majority opinion in Brown follows the correct analysis of first
determining whether, under state law, there has been a waiver of sov-
ereign immunity, and then addressing the federal issue of whether the
state workers' compensation act impermissibly interferes with substan-
tive rights under federal maritime law.95 Though a sovereign is under
no obligation to waive its immunity as to maritime suits, once it has
done so, the sovereign cannot adversely modify the rights of injured
state seamen who bring suit against it in its own courts.
A similar analysis produced a different, but consistent result in
Morris v. Massachusetts Maritime Academy. 96 In Morris, the estates of
two deceased Massachusetts Maritime Academy cadets brought Jones
Act and general maritime law claims in Massachusetts Superior Court
against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the Academy.97
The court found that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was enti-
tled to assert sovereign immunity against the Jones Act and general
maritime law claims, but that the Commonwealth had partially
waived its sovereign immunity by consenting to be sued for liability up
to $100,000.98 Unlike the workers' compensation exclusivity provision
struck down in Brown as an invalid infringement on federal law, the
$100,000 liability limitation in Morris was upheld.99
The differing outcomes in Morris and Brown can be explained by
the proximity of the statutory language limiting liability to the waiver
of sovereign immunity. While the workers' compensation limitation
in Alaska law appears in a statute other than CATSA,100 the $100,000
liability limitation in Massachusetts law appears in the very statute
that waives sovereign immunity. The Morris court noted:
The plaintiff's argument, however, divorces the liability limitation
from the jurisdictional context in which it arises. The limitation is
contained in the same sentence in which sovereign immunity is
waived. It is clear, therefore, that the Legislature intended to waive
immunity only up to the $100,000 limit. The cap is one term of the
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.11 (Norman T. Singer ed., rev. ed.
1984)). Thus, the exceptions to CATSA should be limited to those explicitly
enumerated.
95. Brown, 794 P.2d at 110-11.
96. 565 N.E.2d 422 (Mass. 1991).
97. Id. at 424. Claims had first been filed against the Commonwealth in federal
district court; however, the federal court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 424 n.4.
98. Id. at 427-28 (discussing MAss. GEN. L. ch. 258, § 2 (1988)).
99. Id. at 428.
100. The workers' compensation exclusivity provision is found in Alaska Statutes
section 23.30.055; the waiver of sovereign immunity is found in Alaska Statutes sec-
tion 09.50.250.
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waiver. Because of our holding... that, absent consent, the Com-
monwealth would be entitled to complete immunity, it follows that
the Commonwealth may partially waive its immunity. 10 1
The Alaska Supreme Court would likely agree with the outcome
in Morris because the limitation on the Jones Act remedy appears in
the Massachusetts statute that waives sovereign immunity. Recogniz-
ing the importance of the proximity of the limitation to the waiver,
Brown states:
[T]he waiver of immunity contained in the Alaska Claims Against
the State Act is not conditioned on preserving the defense in ques-
tion here - the exclusive remedy provision .... [T]he legislature
could make the exclusive remedy defense applicable to federal mari-
time claims by referring to the defense in the sovereign immunity
waiver contained in the Claims Act. However, the legislature has
not chosen to do so.1 .2
2. Policy Considerations The first paragraph in Justice
Compton's dissent sets forth his perception of an inequity that flows
from the majority's ruling:
Assuming the court's conclusion is correct, state employed mari-
time workers stand to recover more than state employed land-based
workers who suffer the same injury in a virtually identical accident.
If the court is wrong, then state employed maritime workers stand
to recover less than their privately employed counterparts. Thus,
under either result, inequities are inevitable. However, traditional
methods of statutory analysis lead to the conclusion that sovereign
immunity was retained as to Jones Act suits.103
Justice Compton is correct in observing that state-employed
seamen who sue the state in tort under the Jones Act may be able "to
recover more than state employed land-based workers who suffer the
same injury."'' 4 The result is not necessarily inequitable, though, be-
cause seamen are exposed to many hazards and risks that their shore-
based counterparts never face. Because of the unique hazards that
seamen face, courts have afforded them special status and protec-
tions.'05 Recognizing this, the United States Congress has seen fit to
101. Morris, 565 N.E.2d at 428 (citation omitted).
102. State Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Brown, 794 P.2d 108, 111 (Alaska 1990).
103. Brown, 794 P.2d at 111-12 (Compton, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 112.
105. Seamen are "wards of admiralty" and are protected by the courts from over-
reaching by a ship's owner, master or employer. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318
U.S. 724 (1943); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1939); Harden v.
Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6,047). This special status is afforded
seamen due to the unique hazards they face:
From the earliest times, maritime nations have recognized that unique
hazards, emphasized by unusual tenure and control, attend the work of
seamen. The physical risks created by natural elements and the limitations
of human adaptability to work at sea, enlarge the narrower and more strictly
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grant seamen the right to sue their employers in tort. 0 6 Stripping
state-employed seamen of their tort remedy appears to the state, and
to Justice Compton, to offer a fair and balanced approach because
land-based workers and seamen would all be restricted to the same
compensation remedy; however, such a scheme fails to address ade-
quately the hazards unique to employment aboard a vessel in
navigation.
The second prong of Justice Compton's "inequities" analysis
compares the rights of state-employed seamen with those of private
seamen. The dissenting Justice observed that "[i]f the court is wrong,
then state employed maritime workers stand to recover less than their
privately employed counterparts."' 1 07 Justice Compton is correct in
pointing out that if state-employed seamen were precluded from suing
their employers in tort under the Jones Act, then "state employed
maritime workers stand to recover less than their privately employed
counterparts" who could sue their private employers in tort under the
Jones Act. This scenario would present a genuine inequity. Had the
majority accepted the approach advocated by the State of Alaska,
state-employed seamen would be restricted to compensation while pri-
vate seamen would still have a Jones Act remedy. The majority opin-
ion avoided this outcome by allowing state-employed seamen to retain
the same Jones Act remedy enjoyed by private seamen.
VI. LEGISLATIVE ACTION
A. Power to Amend CATSA
The Alaska Legislature has the power to restrict the state's
waiver of sovereign immunity and thereby overturn Brown.'08 This
could be accomplished through an amendment to CATSA:
If it is the desire of the State to limit its tort liability to the work-
men's compensation act, it may do so by legislative enactment of an
occupational hazards of sailing and operating vessels. And the restrictions
which accompany living aboard ship for long periods at a time combine with
the constant shuttling between unfamiliar ports to deprive the seaman of the
comforts and opportunities for leisure, essential for living and working, that
accompany most land occupations. Furthermore, the seaman's unusual sub-
jection to authority adds to the weight of what would be involuntary servi-
tude for others to these extraordinary hazards and limitations of ship life.
Aguilar, 318 U.S. at 727 (footnote omitted).
106. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988).
107. Brown, 794 P.2d at 112 (Compton, J., dissenting).
108. "Ihe legislature could make the exclusive remedy defense applicable to fed-
eral maritime claims by referring to the defense in the sovereign immunity waiver
contained in the Claims Act. However, the legislature has not chosen to do so." Id.
at Ill.
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exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity section contained in
[Alaska Statutes section] 09.50.250.109
The restriction presently found in the WCA has been determined to be
an impermissible infringement on federal maritime rights, rather than
a permissible retention of sovereign immunity. 110 If the legislature de-
termines that state-employed seamen should not be allowed to sue the
State of Alaska under the Jones Act, then it can modify CATSA to
specify that the state is not waiving sovereign immunity as to maritime
claims brought by its employees.111
An amendment to CATSA may be the only vehicle that could bar
maritime tort claims by state-employed seamen. The Alaska Supreme
Court recently struck down as "completely invalid" a clause in a
Marine Engineer's Beneficial Association union contract with the
State of Alaska that purported to substitute a compensation remedy
for remedies available under the Jones Act and the doctrines of unsea-
worthiness and maintenance and cure. 112 The court, relying on fed-
eral law, held that a sailor's right to maintenance and cure,
unseaworthiness benefits and Jones Act relief "cannot be abrogated by
contract." 113 The pre-injury release of federal maritime rights in the
contract was struck down as inconsistent with the controlling princi-
ples of maritime law. 114 The majority reiterated its support for the
first Brown decision by declaring "the state is subject to suit [in supe-
rior court] under the Jones Act and the admiralty doctrines of mainte-
nance and cure and unseaworthiness." 115
109. Id. at 110 (quoting 28 Op. Att'y Gen. 13 (1963)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 110-11.
112. Dale C. Brown v. State, No. S-3811, slip op. at 17, n.5 (Alaska Aug. 30,
1991). This second major admiralty opinion involved another state employee whose
last name, coincidentally, was Brown.
113. Id. at 10-11. In support of its holding that Jones Act remedies cannot be
abrogated by a union contract, the Alaska Supreme Court relied upon section 5 of the
FELA, which is incorporated into the Jones Act and prohibits "[a]ny contract ... the
purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself
from any liability created by this chapter." 45 U.S.C. § 55 (1988). The court relied on
Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 371 (1932); Gardiner v. Sea-
Land Service, Inc., 738 F.2d 943, 946 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 924 (1986) and
Barnes v. Andover Co., 900 F.2d 630, 637 (3d Cir. 1990) in striking down the abroga-
tion of the right to maintenance and cure, and Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S.
85, 94 (1946) and Reed v. Steamship Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 414-15 (1963) in striking the
abrogation of unseaworthiness benefits. Dale C. Brown, slip op. at 10-17.
114. Dale C. Brown, slip op. at 10-11. Justice Compton again dissented, accusing
the majority of "an even greater willingness to sacrifice state sovereignty to federal
supremacy without a clear federal constitutional requirement." Id. at 19 (Compton,
J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 4 n.1.
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B. Constitutional Considerations
Before making a decision to restrict the waiver of sovereign im-
munity in CATSA, the legislature should consider whether it would be
unconstitutional to extend the Alaska workers' compensation regime
to seamen such as Robert Brown. The United States Supreme Court
held in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen116 that the application of a
state's workers' compensation statute to maritime injuries "conflicts
with the general maritime law, which constitutes an integral part of
the federal law under Art. III, § 2, of the Constitution, and to that
extent is invalid."117 Under the Jensen rule,118 states are constitution-
ally barred from applying their compensation regimes to maritime in-
juries because to do so would interfere with the overriding federal
policy of uniformity in maritime law." 9 While an exception to this
rule exists for those whose work is maritime yet local in character,1 20
state employees such as Brown who are "blue-water seamen" working
aboard vessels on actual navigable waters do not fall within the
exception.121
116. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
117. Id. at 212. The Workmen's Compensation Commission of New York in Jen-
sen ordered Southern Pacific Company to pay compensation to the widow of Christen
Jensen, a maritime employee who died while unloading cargo from the steamship El
Oriente Id. at 208-09. The steamship company objected to the award on the grounds
that the state compensation act did "not afford an exclusive remedy, but leaves the
employer and its vessels subject to suit in admiralty; also that the Act is unconstitu-
tional in that it violates Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution conferring admiralty
jurisdiction upon the courts of the United States." Id. at 210. The United States
Supreme Court found the state compensation act, which imposed penalties on employ-
ers who refused to pay into a state fund, to be abhorrent to the uniformity of the
maritime law:
If New York can subject foreign ships coming into her ports to such obliga-
tions as those imposed by her Compensation Statute, other States may do
likewise. The necessary consequence would be destruction of the very uni-
formity in respect to maritime matters which the Constitution was designed
to establish; and freedom of navigation between the States and with foreign
countries would be seriously hampered and impeded.
Id. at 217.
118. Neither the trial court nor the Alaska Supreme Court addressed the Jensen
issue of the unconstitutionality of the application of a state workers' compensation
regime to Robert Brown's maritime employment. The lack of discussion of Jensen by
the supreme court may be explained either by the limited scope of the petition for
review, or by the court's resolution of the sovereign immunity issue negating the ne-
cessity of reaching the Jensen constitutional issue.
119. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 217-18.
120. Sun Ship v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715 (1980).
121, Anderson v. Alaska Packers Ass'n, 635 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Alaska 1981);
Alaska Indus. Bd. v. Alaska Packers Ass'n, 186 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1951).
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The United States Supreme Court's decision in Welch v. Texas
Department of Highways & Public Transportation 122 has, perhaps un-
intentionally, drawn into question the continued viability of Jensen.
In an attempt to demonstrate that denial of a federal forum would not
leave the petitioner Jean Welch without a remedy, the Court noted
that she could file a workers' compensation claim against the State
under the Texas Tort Claims Act. 23 Allowing the State of Texas to
apply its compensation regime to a blue-water seaman appears to be
inconsistent with Jensen.
It is unclear whether Welch has overruled Jensen sub silentio, or
whether the footnote was merely dicta whose ramifications were not
fully considered by the Court. 124 If the holding of Jensen is still good
law, then it appears that it may be unconstitutional for Alaska to ex-
tend its compensation regime to blue-water seamen such as Robert
Brown. If, on the other hand, Welch overruled Jensen, then the Jen-
sen progeny in Alaska, Anderson v. Alaska Packers Ass'n,125 is no
longer good law. The legislature would then be free to apply its com-
pensation regime to seamen such as Robert Brown.' 26
122. 483 U.S. 480 (1987).
123. Id. at 488 n.19.
124. The Court later referenced its statement that a compensation remedy is avail-
able to Welch, commenting that "as for the view that it would be 'pernicious' to pro-
tect States from liability for their 'unlawful conduct,' we have noted above that an
aggrieved citizen such as petitioner in fact has a bundle of possible remedies." Id. at
495 n.28 (citation omitted). The "bundle" of remedies the court suggested are avail-
able to an injured state employee include suits against state officials rather than the
state itself; injunctive or prospective relief against the state; suit against a municipality
or other local government agency under 42 U.S.C. section 1983; and state workers'
compensation. Id. at 488.
125. 635 P.2d 1182 (Alaska 1981). Anderson held that application of Alaska's
Workers' Compensation Act to blue-water seamen violates Article III, Section 2 of
the United States Constitution. Id. at 1185.
126. The Jensen doctrine has survived many predictions of its early demise. As the
Alaska Supreme Court noted in Anderson:
While it has been suggested several times since the Jensen case was decided
that the Court had abandoned the principles stated there ... the case instead
"has a tenacity which refuses to acquiesce in occasional contemporary re-
ports of its final rejection.. . ." We hold here that Anderson's case comes
within the Court's description of Jensen's applicability.
Anderson, 635 P.2d at 1185 n.2 (citation omitted). Finding that the "maritime yet
local" exception did not apply to a commercial fisherman injured while fishing on
navigable waters approximately one mile offshore, the Alaska Supreme Court held
that the state compensation regime could not be applied, stating:
We find it unnecessary to determine whether there is a twilight zone between
the seamen's remedies and the workers' compensation system because we
find Anderson's employment "on his vessel in navigable waters is in 'clear
daylight' ..... " Where the facts ... show a claimant engaged in wholly
maritime work, the courts have declined to lengthen the shadow of the twi-
light zone, and have remitted the claimants to their federal remedies.
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C. Possible Consequences of Legislative Overruling of Brown
Restricting the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Claims
Against the State Act could leave injured state-employed seamen with-
out a remedy. Welch v. Texas Department of Highways & Public
Transportation 127 and Collins v. State128 demonstrate that state-em-
ployed seamen cannot bring Jones Act suits against Alaska in federal
court. If the Alaska Legislature withdraws the state's consent to be
sued under the Jones Act in its own courts, injured state employees
would be prohibited from suing the state in tort in any court. Applica-
tion of the constitutional prohibition against extension of state com-
pensation regimes to maritime injuries found in Anderson v. Alaska
Packers Ass'n 129 and Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen 130 would further
result in the denial of all compensation benefits to injured state
seamen.' 3 ' In such a scenario, the injured seamen would likely agree
with the four dissenting justices in Welch that the Hans-Welch rule
prohibiting a citizen from suing his own state in federal court "is per-
nicious" and "intrudes on the ideal of liberty under law by protecting
the States from consequences of their... conduct."' 3 2
D. Possible Congressional Response to Welch
The prong of Parden v. Terminal Railway 133 which apparently
survives the Welch decision indicates that Congress retains the power
under the Commerce Clause to abrogate state sovereign immunity
from suit in federal court where a state engages in interstate com-
merce.'34 Congress has, however, failed to "express its intention to
Id. at 1185-86 (citation omitted).
127. 483 U.S. 480 (1987).
128. 823 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1987).
129. 635 P.2d 1182 (Alaska 1981). See supra part VI B.
130. 244 U.S. 205 (1917). See supra part VI B.
131. Nor could relief be had under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compen-
sation Act ("LHWCA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1988). LHWCA excludes from its
coverage members of the crew of vessels, id. § 902(3)(G), such as Robert Brown.
132. Welch, 483 U.S. at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 302 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
133. 377 U.S. 184 (1964). See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
134. Id. at 192. Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Parden held that "the States
surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they granted Congress the power to
regulate commerce." Id. at 191. The Court noted that "the power over commerce...
among the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single
government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the
power as are found in the constitution of the United States." Id. (quoting Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824)). The Court also relied upon United States v.
California, which held that "[t]he sovereign power of the states is necessarily dimin-
ished to the extent of the grants of power to the federal government in the Constitu-
tion . . . . [Tlhere is no such limitation upon the plenary power to regulate
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abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language" in the
current version of the Jones Act.135
Congress could amend the Jones Act to express in unmistakable
language that the statute authorizes suit against state employers as
well as private employers. If the Jones Act were so amended, state-
employed seamen who sustain injury could bring Jones Act claims in
federal court against a state even if the state had not statutorily waived
its sovereign immunity. A challenge by a state to such a suit could test
the continued vitality of Parden. If the congressional power to subject
states to suits in federal court under the Jones Act were upheld, state
limitations upon such suits would likely be struck down irrespective of
whether the limitation appears in a state's sovereign immunity statute
or its workers' compensation statute.
VII. CONCLUSION
So long as Congress leaves the Jones Act in its present form, that
is, without specifying its intent that the Act apply to state as well as
private employers, the states are free to assert sovereign immunity
against Jones Act suits brought by state employees. In this environ-
ment, restrictions on state-employees' Jones Act remedy will likely
survive if the restriction appears in and as a part of a limited waiver of
sovereign immunity. Where a restriction on the remedy of seamen
appears elsewhere than in a statute waiving sovereign immunity, it will
likely be struck down as an invalid infringement of federal maritime
rights.
State-employed seamen can presently sue under the Jones Act in
Alaska state court. The Alaska Supreme Court has ruled that neither
sovereign immunity nor the exclusivity provisions of the Workers'
Compensation Act bars a Jones Act suit against the State of Alaska in
state court. Although seamen retain a tort remedy not shared by land
workers, the majority opinion in Brown avoided an inequity that could
have resulted had state-employed seamen been deprived of the Jones
Act remedy afforded private seamen.
Whether the Claims Against the State Act should be modified to
restrict the remedy of the injured state-employed seaman is a policy
question that can be determined by the legislature. In making its de-
termination, the legislature should consider the issue, not addressed in
Brown, of the unconstitutionality of applying Alaska's workers com-
pensation regime to blue-water seamen. It may be that Welch has
overruled the Jensen prohibition against states applying their workers'
commerce." Id. (quoting United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 184-85 (1936));
see also Welch, 483 U.S. at 478 n.8.
135. Welch, 483 U.S. at 474 (quoting Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 243).
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compensation regimes to maritime workers. If this is the case, then
the legislature may choose to restrict state seamen to a compensation
remedy. On the other hand, if the loose language in Welch is not con-
strued as overruling Jensen, then the Anderson v. Alaska Packers Ass'n
prohibition against Alaska applying its compensation regime to mari-
time workers remains viable. Amending the Claims Against the State
Act so as to retain sovereign immunity against Jones Act claims in
state court could therefore leave injured state seamen with neither a
Jones Act remedy nor a workers' compensation remedy.
